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Abstract—Performing machine learning tasks in mobile appli-
cations yields a challenging conflict of interest: highly sensitive
client information (e.g., speech data) should remain private while
also the intellectual property of service providers (e.g., model
parameters) must be protected. Cryptographic techniques offer
secure solutions for this, but have an unacceptable overhead and
moreover require frequent network interaction.
In this work, we design a practically efficient hardware-based
solution. Specifically, we build OFFLINE MODEL GUARD (OMG)
to enable privacy-preserving machine learning on the pre-
dominant mobile computing platform ARM—even in offline
scenarios. By leveraging a trusted execution environment for
strict hardware-enforced isolation from other system compo-
nents, OMG guarantees privacy of client data, secrecy of
provided models, and integrity of processing algorithms. Our
prototype implementation on an ARM HiKey 960 develop-
ment board performs privacy-preserving keyword recognition
using TensorFlow Lite for Microcontrollers in real time.
Index Terms—TEE, TrustZone, private ML, speech processing
I. INTRODUCTION
An increasing number of applications running on mobile
devices like smartphones and tablets relies on machine learn-
ing (ML) services to enhance the user experience, e.g., to give
an estimate on battery life based on user behavior, improve
image quality, or perform speech recognition.
Many of these ML services require frequent cloud inter-
action, resulting in severe privacy risks for billions of users due
to the highly sensitive nature of such remotely processed data.
Besides potentially confidential and intimate content, voice
recordings, for example, contain unique biometric informa-
tion that can be abused, e.g., for impersonation attacks and
distributing fake recordings.
Privacy breaches in this domain are not fiction: in 2018, a
customer requested his recording archive from Amazon, but
accidentally got access to 1,700 audio files from a stranger [1].
Furthermore, state authorities ordered Amazon to hand out
recordings as they might contain evidence of crime [2]. Media
reports also revealed that Apple, among others, sent voice
recordings to third party companies in order to improve their
service with manual transcriptions. The employees of those
companies got to listen to private discussions between doctors
and patients, business deals, criminal dealings, and sexual en-
counters [3]. Moreover, biometric data used for identification
was recently leaked at a large scale: the database of a UK
government contractor with more than a million fingerprints
and facial recognition information was publicly accessible [4].
When relying on online services for mobile ML applica-
tions, there are also usability issues to consider: high latency
and, therefore, a bad user experience occurs if the user has
an unreliable or low-bandwidth network connection, and high
roaming fees may apply if the user is abroad.
A trivial solution for all these issues is to process all sensi-
tive user data on the client’s device. Previously, this approach
was severely limited by the storage space constraints on mobile
devices and the storage space requirements of ML models used
in practice. Recently, though, Google lifted this limitation by
training a recurrent neural network (RNN) model for character-
level speech recognition and compressing it to only 80 MB,
while delivering the same accuracy as former cloud-based
production models with a size of multiple gigabytes [5], [6].
However, deploying such a model in unencrypted form is
often not in the interest of the service provider. A production-
level model constitutes intellectual property as the underlying
training data is usually hard to obtain and creating an ac-
curate while compact model requires extensive expertise [7].
Furthermore, if attackers have unrestricted model access, the
privacy of people represented in the training data is even
more threatened by, e.g., membership inference attacks [8]
and unintended memorization [9].
Cryptographic techniques like homomorphic encryp-
tion (HE) and secure multi-party computation (SMPC) provide
solutions for this conflict of interest: with HE, private inputs
can be securely processed under encryption by the client or the
service provider, whereas with SMPC, client and server can
jointly compute any function on private inputs in a provably
secure protocol. Unfortunately, the computational overhead
for HE when performing complex ML tasks is impractical
for the given mobile scenario, whereas the amount and the
frequency of required network communication is the bottle-
neck for SMPC protocols. Thus, we explore hardware-assisted
solutions to deliver secure and private ML on mobile devices
in offline scenarios while providing practical efficiency.
Our Contributions. In this work, we build OFFLINE
MODEL GUARD (OMG), a generic architecture that effi-
ciently protects machine learning tasks on mobile devices like
smartphones and tablets, and demonstrate its practicality using
offline keyword recognition as an example application.
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OMG leverages unprivileged (normal-world) user-space en-
claves on ARM platforms to execute ML tasks in a hardware-
protected environment that is two-way isolated from all other
system components to minimize the attack surface. Utiliz-
ing TrustZone functionality, OMG can securely access periph-
erals like the microphone to protect sensitive information di-
rectly from the source. As a result, OMG guarantees complete
privacy of client data, secrecy of the provided ML models, and
integrity of processing algorithms.
We provide a fully functional prototype implementation
of OMG on an ARM HiKey 960 development board for
offline keyword recognition based on TensorFlow Lite for
Microcontrollers [10]. As TrustZone on ARM does not provide
user-space enclaves, we leverage SANCTUARY [11] for our
implementation. Our performance evaluation demonstrates that
secure and private offline speech processing is possible in
real time even with strong protection guarantees. As we
developed our prototype with TensorFlow compatibility in
mind, our implementation can easily be extended to network
architectures used for other related tasks such as end-to-
end continuous speech recognition, speaker verification, and
emotion recognition.
II. RELATED WORK
In the following, we review existing works that preserve
privacy in machine learning. The goal there is usually to train
a model on the server side without allowing the server to
see training data in the clear, or to obliviously classify input
data without leaking the model (inference). Proposed solutions
either rely entirely on cryptography or build on TEEs.
For protecting only the IP of ML models there also exist
orthogonal works for model watermarking [12] and finger-
printing [13] that do not consider the privacy of client inputs.
A. Cryptography
The cryptographic techniques used for privacy-preserving
machine learning are homomorphic encryption (HE) and se-
cure multi-party computation (SMPC). Also, combinations of
these techniques are being studied. HE allows to perform
operations directly on encrypted data, but generally incurs a
high computational overhead. SMPC allows multiple parties
to jointly perform secure computations on shared data. This
works by obliviously evaluating a Boolean or arithmetic circuit
representation of the desired functionality, but results in a
high communication overhead and for some protocols requires
interaction for each layer of the circuit.
For cryptographic protocols it is possible to formally prove
security with respect to input privacy. However, many pro-
tocols and corresponding implementations assume that both
client and server honestly follow the protocol description.
This assumption is unrealistic in real-world scenarios since
mobile clients might run modified applications. Securing such
protocols against malicious parties comes at additional cost.
Privacy-preserving neural network inference via HE
and SMPC was studied in [14]–[16]. Thereafter, many frame-
works for privacy-preserving machine learning have been
developed, e.g., [17]–[22]. They allow at least for secure
deep/convolutional neural network inference and are usually
benchmarked with standard image classification tasks.
Using such cryptographic frameworks requires expert
knowledge and thus they are hardly accessible for ML ex-
perts. However, recently there are efforts to integrate cryp-
tographic protocols into standard ML tools: for TensorFlow
there are HE [23] and SMPC [24] implementations, and
for Intel’s ngraph compiler there exists HE support [25].
Unfortunately, the current performance results discourage
from actual deployment and scaling them to more involved
speech processing tasks seems unrealistic [26]. Addressing all
outlined disadvantages, with OMG we propose a computation-
and communication-efficient hardware-assisted design for se-
cure and private ML on mobile devices that enforces correct
execution of the algorithms and can easily be used by ML ex-
perts due to TensorFlow Lite compatibility.
B. Trusted Execution Environments (TEEs)
Compared to cryptographic techniques, trusted execution
environment (TEE) architectures provide several orders of
magnitude better performance for protecting ML services [27].
Most of the existing works rely on Intel SGX as the dedi-
cated TEE architecture to protect ML services.
Ohrimenko et al. [28] protect ML algorithms and models
in SGX enclaves. They consider a scenario where sensitive
data from multiple data providers is aggregated on a remote
server while SGX enclaves are used to protect the training
process. However, the enclaves might leak information to the
untrusted software on the server through data-dependent access
patterns, which can be exploited in controlled-channel at-
tacks [29], [30]. Therefore, the authors develop data-oblivious
variants of standard ML techniques, e.g., support vector ma-
chines, neural networks, and decision trees, which guarantee
that all memory accesses do not depend on secret data.
In Chiron [31], an ML-as-a-Service (MLaaS) scenario is
considered where sensitive data is collected from customers
and used for training without revealing the data to the MLaaS
provider. This is achieved by performing the training process
in a Ryoan [32] sandbox (based on SGX), which protects
sensitive customer data but still offers the service provider the
possibility to freely select, configure, and train the models.
Myelin [33] provides security guarantees similar to [28]
as it relies on data-oblivious deep learning algorithms: every
model owner compiles its deep learning model into a privacy-
preserving model graph, which is then trained on a remote
server (inside an SGX enclave) on sensitive data.
In [34], the authors introduce an alternative protection
mechanism against controlled-channel attacks that is more
efficient and suitable for real-time data processing. The authors
propose to add noise to memory traces by accessing dummy
data instead of enforcing data-oblivious memory accesses.
VoiceGuard [35] targets the use case of privacy-preserving
speech processing. For this, sensitive voice recordings are col-
lected from user devices, e.g., smart home devices like Ama-
zon Echo, Google Home, and Apple HomePod, and are sent
via secure channels to a service provider. The service provider
performs speech recognition using proprietary models pro-
vided by ML specialists in an SGX enclave, thereby protecting
the user data as well the proprietary models. The inference
results are then securely sent back to the user device. Very
recent work [36] also enables efficient private online speech
recognition but uses obfuscation techniques and the notion of
differential privacy, which significantly degrades accuracy.
In contrast, MLCapsule [37] considers an offline MLaaS
scenario where the trained model is used on the client side for
inference while being protected using an SGX enclave.
None of the previous works considers the challenge of
how user data can be securely collected on the user device.
Intel SGX, which is mostly used as the dedicated TEE archi-
tecture, is not able to provide a secure communication channel
from enclaves to system peripherals, e.g., the microphone or
camera [38]. Thus, sensitive user data is endangered as it
could be exfiltrated by malicious software running on the client
device. With OMG, we present the first TEE architecture that
provides protection for proprietary ML models and privacy-
sensitive user input at the same time. Furthermore, while In-
tel SGX is a TEE widely available in recent Intel CPUs, most
mobile devices like smartphones and tablets come with CPUs
based on the ARM platform. This prevents using the previ-
ously proposed SGX-based solutions for securing relevant use
cases on mobile devices, e.g., offline speech recognition. Thus,
in this work, we present OMG for ARM-based devices and as
an example application demonstrate privacy-preserving offline
keyword recognition in real time.
III. BACKGROUND
In the following, we introduce relevant details regarding
the ARM TrustZone TEE implementation and the SANCTU-
ARY security architecture [11] for user-space enclaves.
A. ARM TrustZone
Trusted execution environments (TEEs) combine memory
isolation techniques [39]–[41] and attestation [42] with iso-
lated execution to provide protected execution of security-
critical code. For mobile devices, the predominant computing
platform is ARM, which provides a TEE implementation
called ARM TrustZone [43]. A chip with TrustZone capabili-
ties simultaneously runs two security contexts (or “worlds”) as
virtual processors: a “normal world” and an isolated “secure
world” (cf. Fig. 1). While the normal world executes a
commodity OS (e.g., Android) and ordinary applications, the
secure world forms a TEE for running security-critical code
on a trusted OS.
A major assumption of TrustZone is that an attacker cannot
compromise code running in the secure world. Unfortunately,
the TrustZone design is flawed in this aspect: the isolation
between applications in the secure world is rather weak and
the attack surface is massively increased the more applications
run therein [44]. Thus, the secure world with its privileged
platform access is an attractive target for adversaries.
Physical Memory Partitioning
Virtual Memory
App App
Trusted 
App
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Fig. 1: ARM TrustZone architecture overview.
B. SANCTUARY
SANCTUARY [11] is a security architecture that circum-
vents the previously explained flaws of ARM TrustZone
without requiring hardware extensions, heavy modifications of
existing code bases, or major changes in the commodity OS. In
particular, it allows to run security-critical code in user-space
enclaves or so-called SANCTUARY Apps (SAs). SAs are exe-
cuted in a normal-world environment that is protected via strict
hardware-enforced two-way isolation from all other system
components to minimize the attack surface. This is achieved
by leveraging TrustZone’s address space controller (TZASC)
to exclusively bind memory to a (temporarily) dedicated CPU
core running an SA.
The life cycle when running an SA is as follows:
1) Setup: Memory for the SA instance is prepared by loading
the SANCTUARY library (SL), which is implemented us-
ing the Zircon microkernel [45], and the SA. The TZASC
is securely configured to isolate this memory region and
the least busy CPU core is shut down. Besides the isolated
memory, additional memory regions are shared with the
commodity OS and the secure world, which allows the SA
to access the secure world and (untrusted) OS services.
2) Boot: The memory is attested and the CPU core is booted
with the SL providing a basic execution environment.
3) Execution: The SA runs as a normal-world user process,
potentially using services provided by the commodity OS
or secure world code.
4) Teardown: The CPU core is shut down, data in the first
level cache (L1) is invalidated, the SA memory is cleaned
and unlocked, and finally the CPU core is handed back to
the commodity OS.
SANCTUARY provides code and data integrity as well as
data confidentiality, is secure against malicious SAs, and has
no negative impact on the user experience due to the wide
availability of multicore chips for mobile devices. Further-
more, side-channel attacks that extract secrets from caches can
be prevented easily since the L1 cache is core exclusive and the
shared second level cache (L2) can be excluded from SANC-
TUARY memory without severe performance impact [11].
SANCTUARY extends TrustZone to provide an arbitrary
number of user-space enclaves. Additionally, SANCTUARY
inherits many useful features from TrustZone like secure boot
or DMA attack protection. Moreover, TrustZone allows to
assign sensitive peripherals exclusively to the secure world.
An SA can use this feature by sending communication requests
to the secure world code. After checking the permission rights
of the SA, the secure world reads from the sensitive data and
directly stores it in the memory region shared with the SA.
Thus, performance overhead is only produced by the additional
world switches between the SA and the secure world.
IV. SECURITY MODEL AND ASSUMPTIONS
In this paper, we consider two parties collaborating to
perform ML tasks on sensitive data provided by one party
while protecting the intellectual property of the other party.
The user U provides input data to be processed. She is con-
cerned about the privacy of the content to be processed (i.e.,
her inputs as well as outputs) and biometric characteristics
potentially used throughout processing. Lastly, the user does
not want to be traceable across multiple sessions.
The vendor V (who might act as the service provider)
provides ML algorithms including corresponding models. The
models constitute the vendor’s intellectual property, hence the
user must not be able to reverse engineer, share, or break the
license check of these models.
Adversary Model. The adversary’s goal is to extract sen-
sitive information, i.e., the intellectual property of the vendor,
the input and output of the user, or data that allows the
adversary to identify or track the user. We assume that the
adversary is in control of the user’s device. The adversary has
full control over the software running in the normal world
of the user’s device, including privileged software like the
commodity OS. We assume that the adversary cannot perform
hardware attacks, e.g., a physical side channel to extract secret
keys. For the enclave we assume that all of SANCTUARY’s
defense mechanisms are in place, including hardware cache
partitioning (for a detailed discussion see [11]).
V. OMG DESIGN
OMG enables privacy-preserving and efficient offline exe-
cution of ML algorithms on untrusted ARM-based systems.
For the sake of simplicity, we explain our solution based on
the speech recognition scenario visualized in Fig. 2.
The vendor V’s private input consists of a ML model. The
user U’s private input consists of voice recordings. In this
example, the ML model is the vendor’s intellectual property
and any information about its architecture or trained weights
must never be disclosed. The only output is the transcription,
which is sent to the user.
OMG works in three phases: (I.) preparation, (II.) initial-
ization, and (III.) operation. In the preparation phase, the
enclave (containing the SL and SA) is loaded and attested
to user U and vendor V. Then, V provides the encrypted ML
model to the enclave. In the initialization phase, V sends the
decryption key for the ML model so that the enclave can
decrypt the model. Finally, in the operation phase, the enclave
is ready to perform offline speech recognition. U sends her
voice recordings to the enclave and receives respective textual
output (which can be further processed into an action, as with
virtual assistants). Next, we detail the individual phases:
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Fig. 2: OMG overview. Once the encrypted model is stored
locally, steps in gray are optional until a model update.
I. Preparation Phase. First, the enclave needs to be run
on U’s device. The enclave contains the environment required
to apply the ML model to input data. The enclave code can be
open source, since it does not contain any vendor secrets (e.g.,
it may just consist of a TensorFlow environment), and can
be distributed by the device manufacturer via regular distri-
bution channels. To load the enclave, its code is first copied
to memory and locked to a dedicated SANCTUARY CPU
core so it cannot be changed anymore by the commod-
ity OS (cf. § III-B). Then, the enclave is attested (“mea-
sured”) by SANCTUARY, i.e., a cryptographic hash of the
initial memory content of the enclave is created and stored
securely. If the enclave code is manipulated before the creation
process, the measurement will produce a different result and
the manipulation will be detected.
SANCTUARY then assigns an unique asymmetric key pair
to this enclave, e.g., by using RSA [46] (the public key PK is
shown in Fig. 2). This key pair is derived from the platform
certificate issued by the device vendor, effectively creating
a certificate hierarchy similar to SSL certificates. To assure
to U that the correct enclave code has been loaded, an
attestation report is generated (i.e., the cryptographic hash of
the initial memory content is signed using the secret key SK
corresponding to PK) and sent to U using the secure output
functionality of SANCTUARY 1 . Such an attestation report
is also sent to V using a secure connection (e.g., via TLS)
directly from the enclave 2 .
Note that the attestation report includes the enclave’s public
key PK. V uses PK and a nonce n to derive a symmetric
encryption key KU used only for this respective enclave and
version of the model. V encrypts the ML model using KU
and securely provisions the model to the enclave 3 .
The enclave then stores the model locally in unprotected
storage 4 . As the model can be loaded from untrusted local
storage, after running the preparation phase once, steps 3
and 4 can be omitted until the vendor’s model is updated.
II. Initialization Phase. Thanks to never making the de-
crypted model directly accessible to U, the initialization phase
can be kept simple while providing strong guarantees to V.
V can actively manage the access of U to the model by
either sending or not sending the symmetric key KU . In case
of, e.g., an expired license, V can stop sending KU to the
enclave, making it fail to decrypt the locally stored model.
If V decides that U should be allowed to use the model, V
securely sends KU 5 to the enclave and the enclave decrypts
the model 6 . As the key KU depends on the nonce n, this
also prevents rollback attacks for U’s locally stored model.
III. Operation Phase. In the operation phase, the actual ML
task takes place. U can directly and securely provide voice
recordings to the enclave as SANCTUARY allows secure input
from peripherals like the microphone 7 by utilizing TrustZone
features as described in § III-B. The speech data is then
processed using the model, the output can be presented to
the user or made available to other applications 8 .
Once in the operation phase, the system can be queried
repetitively, thereby avoiding repeated preparation and initial-
ization costs as well as interaction with V. To do this, after a
query is processed, the SANCTUARY core can be reallocated
to the commodity OS while the memory is still locked such
that no device or core is able to access it. When receiving
a new query, a new SANCTUARY core is allocated and the
locked memory is mapped to it for performing the ML task.
VI. EVALUATION
We demonstrate the practicality of our approach by pro-
viding a fully functional prototype implementation of OMG
on an ARM HiKey 960 development board based on Ten-
sorFlow Lite for Microcontrollers [10] and evaluating our
prototype with an offline keyword recognition application.
The ARM HiKey 960 development board is equipped
with an ARMv8 octa-core SoC (4 cores @ 2.4 GHz,
4 cores @ 1.8 GHz) with 3 GB of RAM, which closely
resembles the specifications of today’s mobile devices. We use
such a development board instead of an off-the-shelf device
since most vendors restrict developer access to TrustZone,
which prevents us from setting up SANCTUARY (cf. § III-B).
As our offline keyword recognition application is just a proof
of concept, following [35], we do not focus on best accuracy,
but study whether accuracy and runtime are affected when
providing strong security guarantees.
The models are trained and evaluated on the Speech Com-
mand dataset [47] consisting of 105,000 WAVE audio files of
people saying 30 different words. The recordings were post-
processed to be a single word per file at a fixed 1 s duration.
We follow the TensorFlow Lite example recipe [10]:
Features are computed using a 256 bin fixed point FFT
across 30 ms windows (20 ms shift), averaging 6 neighboring
bins, resulting in 43 values per frame. The 49 frames for
each recording are concatenated, forming a fixed 49 × 43
compressed spectrogram (“fingerprint”) per utterance.
The network architecture resembles [48], but is simplified
to better match embedded requirements. The tiny_conv
architecture feeds the audio fingerprint to a 2D convolutional
layer (8 filters, 8×10, x and y stride of 2), followed by ReLU
activation and a regular layer that maps to the output labels.
During training, dropout is applied after the convolution layer.
TABLE I: Accuracy and runtime results for running the
keyword recognition with and without OMG protection.
Model Accuracy Runtime
TensorFlow Lite “micro” 75 % 379 ms
TensorFlow Lite “micro” (OMG) 75 % 387 ms
We trained a system for a 12-class problem: silence, un-
known, “yes”, “no”, “up”, “down”, “left”, “right”, “on”, “off”,
“stop”, “go”. The model is first trained using TensorFlow
and subsequently converted to a TensorFlow Lite and “micro”
model. The resulting compressed model is about 49 kB in size.
We evaluated the “micro” model on a subset of the pub-
lished test set comprising 10 examples for each class, exclud-
ing the two rejection classes “silence” and “unknown”, since
sensitivity for those would typically be tuned for production.
Inference was run on a 2.4 GHz core of the ARM de-
velopment board both with and without OMG protection.
Tab. I shows the overall accuracy for the 10 classes, and the
respective runtimes in milliseconds. The accuracy with and
without OMG protection is 75 %, confirming the correctness
of the setup. The runtimes are very close when executed with
and without OMG protection due to the fact that the hardware-
enforced two-way isolation provided by SANCTUARY adds
no additional overhead during execution. Since the overall
duration of the test set is 100 s, the real-time factor is 0.004x.
The runtime measurements do not include the overhead for
collecting the input data from the on-device microphone. As
described in § V, OMG uses the capabilities from SANC-
TUARY to securely connect to sensors. Thus, only the world
switch from an SA to the secure world to request the sensor
data and the switch back to the SA introduce some overhead.
As presented in [11], the switch from an SA to the secure
world takes around 0.3 ms. Therefore, even in the short-
running speech processing use case presented in this paper,
the performance overhead introduced by reading sensor data
via the secure world is negligible.
Our evaluation of a keyword recognition task using spectral
fingerprints and a basic CNN lays the groundwork to port
larger and recurrent architectures as well as to study training
tasks. Since our implementation has no inherent memory
limitations, it also allows to securely run more complex end-to-
end systems, such as the recently released TensorFlow-based
dictation model by Google [6], making it highly practical.
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